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11 Introduction
Fluctuations in oil prices have long been considered a potentially important source of busi-
ness cycles. A vast literature originating from papers by Hamilton (1983), Burbidge and
Harrison (1984), and Gisser and Goodwin (1986) has utilized Vector AutoRegressions to
examine how changes in oil prices relate to future changes in GDP. The empirical relation-
ship between oil price movements and the macroeconomy is still a subject of debate, as
evidenced by many recent papers on the subject.3 After the oil price collapse of 1986 failed
to generate a boom as predicted by a symmetric model, many authors found estimates
from simple VARs using oil price changes to be inadequate. On the other hand, they found
those based on alternative measures of oil price movements to be more robust. Mork (1989)
introduced a simple decomposition of oil price changes to allow for asymmetric responses
of GDP growth to oil price increases and decreases. Following Mork’s (1989) suggestion to
model asymmetry, Lee et al. (1995) and Hamilton (1996, 2003) proposed using the scaled
oil price increase/decrease (SOPI/D) and the net oil price increase/decrease (NOPI/D).4
A focal point of these VAR studies is the response of GDP growth to structural shocks
to oil price changes or to functions of oil price changes. In VAR models, oil prices are
predicted by recent oil prices and macro variables in the VAR. The impulse response of
interest concerns the dynamics of output to unanticipated (structural) shocks in oil price
changes.5
In this paper, we suggest an empirical approach to analyze the oil price-macroeconomy
relationship that differs from the traditional emphasis on oil price shocks. We argue that
changes in the forecasted long-term average of discounted real oil prices can be more in-
fluential on households’ and firms’ decisions than shocks to (functions of) real oil prices.
(We use “average prices” and “averages of prices” interchangeably throughout the paper, in
spite of a possible shade of connotational difference.) Consider two examples of why this is
the case. First, because the average fuel price during the lifespan of transportation equip-
ment determines user cost, a forecast of this average price is a key determinant of demand
for oil-intensive transportation equipment, such as cars, trucks, and airplanes.6 Second,
3For analysis on whether oil shocks affect the macroeconomy through monetary policy, see Bernanke et
al. (1997), Barksy and Kilian (2002, 2004), Hamilton and Herrera (2004), and Herrera and Pesavento (2009).
4For comprehensive analysis of the nonlinear relationship between GDP growth and oil price in-
crease/decrease, see Mork et al. (1994), Hooker (1996), Balke et al. (2002), Jime´nez-Rodr´ıguez (2009),
and Kilian and Vigfusson (2009). Several authors have focused on a structural interpretation of the chang-
ing correlation between oil price growth and GDP growth. Baumeister and Peersman (2008), Miller and
Ratti (2009), Edelstein and Kilian (2009), Kilian and Park (2009), and Blanchard and Gal´ı (2010) examine
the changing correlation between economic outcomes and the real price of oil since the 1970s. Barksy and
Kilian (2002, 2004) recognized the different effects of unanticipated supply and demand shocks to the oil
market on macroeconomic indicators, and Kilian (2008, 2009) has recently used an oil market model to
identify these shocks.
5When a VAR is based on more than one component of oil price changes, there needs to be a constraint
that the components sum to the observed oil price change. In this case, the impulse responses are not well
defined in a conventional VAR. Kilian and Vigfusson (2009) have recently noted other difficulties in using
impulse response analysis with asymmetric responses to shocks to decomposed oil price changes.
6The Energy Information Administration (Oil Market Basics <http://www.eia.doe.gov/pub/oil gas/
petroleum/analysis publications/oil market basics/>) estimates that about two-thirds of the end-use of oil
in the US is for transportation.
2an increase in the value of imported oil induces a negative income effect. The permanent
income hypothesis suggests that an increase in the expected long-term average real oil price
induces a much larger decline in permanent income than would a temporary increase of the
same size. Therefore, a much larger cut in consumption by rational consumers results. In
this light, our approach filters the long-term information conveyed by real price changes as
an approximation to economic agents’ interpretations of these changes.
In order to distinguish the different effects on US real GDP growth, we decompose real
oil price changes into two components. The first component is defined as updates in the
forecast of long-term average prices and is estimated using an oil market model. We denote
this component by ∆oF . The second component, denoted by ∆oU , is defined as changes in
deviations of the oil price from these forecasts. We formally define the latter component at
time t by subtracting ∆oFt and a constant for discounting from the first difference of the log
real oil price at time t. As this component is defined using a residual from the oil market
model, we consider this to be an unanticipated component – hence the notation.
We propose a state-space model for the prediction of the long-term averages of future
real oil price levels. In this model, real oil prices fluctuate around the combination of a time
trend and an unobservable stochastic trend, a modelling strategy loosely based on sug-
gestions of Hotelling (1931), Pindyck (1999), and Hamilton (2009).7 The stochastic trend
captures uncertainty about the long-term average. We present empirical evidence that
global real economic activity and real oil prices share a stochastic trend, after subtracting
different linear trends. Hence, both past real oil prices and real global economic activity
contain useful information for predicting future real oil prices. In this setting, the best
forecast of the future average discounted price is the stochastic trend component, parsimo-
niously filtered using current and historical data on real oil prices and global real economic
activity. According to our results, the multivariate state space specification compares fa-
vorably to several univariate state-space models and rule-of-thumb forecasting models when
considering forecasts of averages over long horizons.
It is important to note that our estimates of changes in the forecasts rely on information
in the levels of real oil prices. In contrast, the conventional VARs discussed above use
changes in (real or nominal) oil prices.
Our empirical results can be summarized as follows. First, changes in the forecasted
long-term average of discounted real oil prices, ∆oF , are much smaller in magnitude than
changes in the fluctuations of real oil prices around these averages, ∆oU . On the other hand
∆oF is more influential on US GDP growth than ∆oU . Focusing only on unanticipated
real oil price shocks (e.g., Kilian, 2009) or only on large price changes (e.g., Hamilton,
1996, 2003) underestimates the effect of real oil price changes. While these authors provide
important tools for analyzing the oil price-macroeconomy relationship, our approach is more
inclusive. Conventional measures may explain the episodes of 1974, 1986, and 1991 well, but
may not explain the lack of an oil-related recession following the 2003-07 oil price run-up.
Blanchard and Gal´ı (2010) noted a “lack of concurrent adverse shocks” during this period.
Our results suggest that persistent upward revision of the forecasted long-term average real
7The linear trend is based on Hotelling’s (1931) assumption that an arbitrage condition holds. Pindyck
(1999) suggested allowing stochastic coefficients on the linear trend, and Hamilton (2009) suggested a stochas-
tic trend. The approaches of stochastic trend and deterministic trend with stochastic coefficients are similar.
3oil price (rather than real oil price shocks) over this period had a substantial negative impact
on real GDP growth.8
Second, we find that positive and negative changes in unanticipated real oil price fluctu-
ations correlate with responses of future GDP growth that are asymmetric in sign, echoing
the results of Mork (1989) for changes in oil prices themselves. Both increases and decreases
in the unanticipated component are followed by decreases in real GDP growth. On the other
hand, responses of real GDP growth to positive and negative changes in the forecasted av-
erage are symmetric in sign but have different magnitudes. Specifically, a 1% increase in
the forecasted average – holding the other components constant and net of a linear upward
trend – is correlated with a 0.11% cumulative decrease in future real GDP growth. On the
other hand, a 1% decrease is correlated with a 0.07% cumulative increase in future real
GDP growth. These results suggest that the main channels through which ∆oF and ∆oU
affect economic activity are different. By using the first difference of real oil price (the sum
of ∆oF and ∆oU ), a traditional VAR, or one modified for asymmetry, does not distinguish
the differential effects of the two components.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In the following section, we present
the basic reduced-form model to estimate the impact of real oil price changes on US economic
growth, and the oil market model used to identify the forecasted long-term average of
discounted real oil prices. Section 3 contains our empirical results, and Section 4 concludes.
Two brief appendices contain a discussion and comparison of alternative oil market models
and a methodological description of our cumulative conditional response functions and
counterfactual US GDP growth rates.
We note that both oil prices and GDP are measured in real terms throughout the paper.
For ease of exposition, further references to GDP and oil prices should be taken to mean
real GDP and real oil prices, unless otherwise specified.
2 Oil Price Forecasts and Economic Growth
Consider the US GDP equation of a standard bivariate reduced-form oil price-macroeconomy
VAR, given by
∆yt = δ +
∑p
k=1
αk∆yt−k +
∑p
k=1
pik∆ot−k + εt, (1)
which is similar to the GDP equation of Hamilton’s (1983) basic model. In this model, (yt)
is the log of real GDP and (ot) is the log of the real price of oil. To estimate this benchmark
model, we regress US GDP growth on p lags of itself and p lags of the growth rate of oil
prices, with p = 4 in our empirical results.
Real oil price growth (∆ot) may be decomposed into updates of forecasted long-term
averages of discounted oil prices (∆oFt ), a constant discounting term that we subsequently
8The sum of Kilian’s (2009) three structural shocks appears to be positive during this period, a result
which is numerically similar to ∆oF . This difference reflects only a minor difference of economic intuition.
From Kilian’s (2009) figures, the strongest driver of oil prices during this period appears to be aggregated
demand shocks. Using our model, the strongest driver during this period is revisions in oil price forecasts,
which are strongly correlated with the growth of global real economic activity. We believe that global
demand is the channel of this correlation.
4denote by γo2 to reflect the time trend from Hotelling’s model, and changes in unanticipated
deviations of the actual price from the forecasted averages (∆oUt ). Formally, ∆ot = γo2 +
∆oFt +∆o
U
t . Once these components are identified, then
∆yt = δ
∗ +
∑p
k=1
αk∆yt−k +
∑p
k=1
piFk ∆o
F
t−k +
∑p
k=1
piUk ∆o
U
t−k + εt. (2)
may be estimated, where δ∗ differs from δ due to γo2.
We use a separate oil market model to identify (∆oFt ), which we discuss below.
2.1 Forecasts of Average Discounted Oil Prices
A key empirical consideration is estimation not only of the change in the forecasted oil price
from time t−1 to time t, but also of the change in the average price up to N periods ahead,
where N reflects the lifespan of energy intensive goods. If we take literally Hotelling’s
(1931) hypothesis in the context of perfect competition, then an arbitrage condition holds
so that the oil price growth rate is equal to a risk-free interest rate γo2. The change in the
forecasted average (log real) price would be simply γo2.
Although Hamilton (2009) has recently suggested the importance of scarcity rents, mak-
ing the linear trend feasible, he also found evidence for a unit root in oil prices. An appro-
priate model for such a forecast is
ot = γo1 + γo2t+ βozt + ηt, (3)
where (zt) is a latent stochastic trend of (ot) – i.e., (zt) is an unobserved random walk,
γo1 + γo2t is a linear trend of (ot), and (ηt) is stationary error. In Hotelling’s model, γo2 is
an interest rate and ot− γo2t is the discounted oil price. In this framework, (ot− γo1− γo2t)
– rather than (ot) – is a driftless unit root process. (ot) itself has drift given by γo2, and γo1
captures its initial observation.
Using the conventional notation that os|t denotes the expectation of os conditional on
the information set available at time t, the forecasted discounted log oil price at t+ j given
information at t is
ot+j|t − γo2(t+ j) = γo1 + βozt|t + ηt+j|t,
where we use the result that zt+j|t, a linear prediction of zt+j with information available at
time t, equals zt|t, following the assumption that zt is a random walk in the model. In the
absence of serial correlation in (ηt), the last term is zero. The average of forecasts up to N
periods ahead is
1
N
∑N
j=1
(ot+j|t − γo2(t+ j)) = γo1 + βozt|t +
1
N
∑N
j=1
ηt+j|t, (4)
where 1
N
∑
ηt+j|t ≈ 0 for a reasonably large forecast horizon N , even in the presence of
weak serial correlation.
5We may also interpret an average of forecasts from a linear model, such as (4), as a
forecast of an average. Now, the first difference of this forecast is given by
1
N
∑N
j=1
(ot+j|t − γo2(t+ j))−
1
N
∑N
j=1
(ot+j−1|t−1 − γo2(t+ j − 1))
= βo(zt|t − zt−1|t−1) +
1
N
∑N
j=1
(ηt+j|t − ηt+j−1|t−1),
where the last term is approximately zero – with or without weak serial correlation. The
above equation suggests we can estimate the change in the forecast of the average of dis-
counted oil prices by
∆oFt = βo(zt|t − zt−1|t−1).
To see how this leads to a decomposition of the first difference in oil price ∆ot, note
from (3) that
∆ot = γo2 + βo∆zt +∆ηt.
This suggests a decomposition
∆ot = γo2 +∆o
F
t +∆o
U
t .
After subtracting the update in the expected long-term average of oil prices from the oil
price change, the unanticipated component
∆oUt = ∆ot − (∆o
F
t + γo2) = ∆ηt + β0[(zt − zt|t)− (zt−1 − zt−1|t−1)]
is the sum of the change in the stationary error ηt and the change in the error from filtering
the stochastic trend, zt − zt|t.
If we use ∆oFt + γo2, the change in the forecasted average of un-discounted oil prices,
instead of ∆oFt in the GDP regression, the estimates of parameters (αk), (pi
F
k ) and (pi
U
k )
would not be altered, since γo2 is absorbed in δ
∗.
2.2 Identification of a Global Oil Market Fundamental
We may interpret (zt) as a global oil market fundamental, because forecasted long-term
average discounted oil prices are primarily driven by estimates of (zt). Note that (zt) reflects
long-term fluctuations around a linear trend. We may interpret these fluctuations as long-
term deviations from Hotelling’s (1931) perfect competition model. Hotelling showed that
under a monopoly pricing scheme, demand for oil also plays a part in determining its price.
In this light, and since hydrocarbons are vital to the global economy, such fluctuations
of the stochastic trend may reflect similar long-term fluctuations in global real economic
activity. If so, then we may expect that the stochastic trend (zt) is common to both real
oil prices and global real economic activity, if long-term supply is relatively steady. These
series may have different linear trends but common long-term stochastic fluctuations around
these linear trends.
Similarly to (3), we let
wt = γw1 + γw2t+ βwzt + η
w
t , (5)
6where (wt) is global real economic activity and (zt) is the same latent stochastic trend.
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With this representation, we specifically mean that three series are cointegrated: (i) fluc-
tuations of (ot) around a linear trend, (ii) fluctuations of (wt) around a different linear
trend, and (iii) the common stochastic trend (zt). The cointegrating vector – orthogonal
to (βo, βw)
′ – does not cointegrate (ot) and (wt), because they may have different linear
trends. Rather, it cointegrates their fluctuations around those linear trends.
The models in (3) and (5) may be estimated jointly using the Kalman filter.10 Using a
similar model but without linear trends, Chang et al. (2009) showed that the steady-state
Kalman filter with unit root in (zt) is an absolutely summable linear process. Summability
implies that estimates of (zt) inherit their order of integration from (ot) and (wt). If these
series are cointegrated, as our empirical evidence below suggests, the Kalman filter provides
an estimate that is cointegrated with the true trend. On the other hand, if these series are
I(0), then estimates of (zt) will also be I(0). Cointegration provides a convenient way to
identify ∆oF and is consistent with subsequent first-differencing. However, even if these
very persistent series are I(0), the Kalman filter still identifies a persistent component ∆oF .
An alternative to the cointegration model of oil price and global real economic activ-
ity to estimate the stochastic trend is to apply the Kalman filter to the oil price model
(3) only. Besides the theoretical argument that the long-term demand for oil is driven by
global economic growth, we have empirical motivation for modeling the stochastic trend in
oil prices jointly with global real economic activity. Joint estimation utilizes more informa-
tion to identify the fundamental, which has smoother changes than the oil price changes
themselves. This distinction is important over the duration of especially volatile periods.
For example, the rapid oil price changes from the early 1970s to 1980 and from 2003 to
2007 make it difficult to forecast long term oil prices based only on historical oil prices.
Historical data on the global economy may be particularly informative on the future long-
term oil price during these periods. This intuitive argument is confirmed quantitatively
in our comparison of competing models for forecasting accuracy of the long-term average
price. The model proposed above dominates a battery of univariate state-space models and
rule-of-thumb forecasting models.
The identification scheme using (3) and (5) may be augmented with more covariates
and adding more equations. In that case, additional latent fundamentals may be added to
reflect multiple stochastic trends.
3 Data and Empirical Results
A quarterly real oil price series is created for 1971-2008 by dividing the monthly West
Texas Intermediate spot oil price by the monthly producer price index (all commodities)
and taking a quarterly average of the resulting series. Global real economic activity is
9This assumption is supported by the panel data study of Lee (2005), which showed that oil consumption
and GDP are cointegrated in many countries.
10See Harvey (1989), Hamilton (1994), or Kim and Nelson (1999) for detailed exposition on the Kalman
filter.
7measured using global real GDP.11,12
3.1 Augmented Oil Market Model
Insert Figure 1 About Here
Figure 1 (top panel) shows linearly detrended log global real economic activity and
linearly detrended log real oil prices scaled by 1/10. Although these series appear to move
together remarkably since the oil price collapse of 1986 and before the Iranian Revolution
of 1979, cointegration cannot be decisively detected over the whole sample period. Since
the magnitude of the 1979 increase and 1986 decrease appear to be roughly similar relative
to the linear trend, we consider an indicator (bt) for 1979Q3-1985Q4. The purpose of the
indicator is simply to control for the apparent mean shift in the data. The increase in 1979
has been conventionally attributed to the announcement of the removal of price controls
in the U.S. in conjunction with supply disruptions in the oil market caused by the Iranian
Revolution in 1979, followed by the Iran-Iraq War and OPEC production cuts. The notion
that this increase was driven by supply has been supported recently by Kilian (2008),
although Kilian (2009) and Kilian and Murphy (2010) also attributed some of this increase
to precautionary demand.
In either case, Figure 1 (bottom panel) shows that the inclusion of the indicator in
detrending brings the mean oil price during this period in line with what might be expected
without the sharp increase. Inclusion shows clearer evidence of cointegration over the whole
sample period, using a standard Phillips-Ouliaris (1990) residual-based test: the null of no
cointegration is rejected at 5% significance. A heuristic explanation is that the long-term
global GDP is correlated with the long-term demand for oil and that this relationship is
captured by the estimated cointegration. The cointegration is more prominently identified
after controlling for the 1979Q3-1985Q4 period using the indicator.
We augment the oil market model given by (3) and (5) with
ot = γo1 + γo2t+ γo3bt + βozt + η
o
t and (6)
wt = γw1 + γw2t+ γw3bt + βwzt + η
w
t , (7)
using the indicator (bt). It is important to note the econometric effect of the indicator. If a
mean shift occurred in 1979 with reversion to the previous mean in 1986, then the regressions
in (6) and (7) are cointegrating. If instead the models in (3) and (5) are estimated, and the
11Annual global GDP data are obtained from Angus Maddison’s historical statistics
(Maddison, 2010, http://www.ggdc.net/Maddison) for 1971-2008. Quarterly OECD GDP is used to interpo-
late global GDP at a quarterly frequency. The interpolation is linear in the difference between the log of the
two series, similarly to Friedman’s (1962) imputation by related series. Due to the stochastic trend shared by
an I(1) low-frequency series and its imputed high-frequency counterpart, imputation bias is asymptotically
negligible and may be preferable to the inefficiency that would result from estimation at the lower frequency
(Miller, 2010).
12We also tried the shipping index that Kilian (2009) used to proxy global real economic activity. Empirical
evidence suggests that this index is not cointegrated with log real oil prices. Miller and Ratti (2009) found
that oil prices are cointegrated with stock market prices in many OECD countries. However, they did not
find the relationship to be stable.
8indicator is relegated to the error term, the regressions do not lose cointegration, because
the indicator itself is not an explosive trend. However, including the indicator improves
estimation.13 We present results with and without the indicator throughout the discussion
of the oil market model in this section.
Insert Table 1 About Here
Empirical results from the oil market model given by (3) and (5) and by (6) and (7)
are shown in Table 1. These results appear to be robust to inclusion or exclusion of the
indicator.
The linear trend coefficient estimates of 0.0106 and 0.0086 for quarterly series suggest
annualized average growth rates of 4.31% for real oil prices and 3.48% for global real eco-
nomic activity. These rates are consistent with our expectations. Moreover, the fact that βo
and βw have the same sign suggests positive cointegration of real oil prices and global real
economic activity around their respective average growth rates. Naturally, as a factor of
production, long-term fluctuations in oil prices should be much larger – by a factor of about
10 in the table and in Figure 1 – than long-term fluctuations in global economic activity.
3.2 Long-Term Forecasting Comparison
Insert Table 2 About Here
Table 2 compares N -period ahead forecasted averages using seven alternative oil price
forecasting models with forecasts based on our global oil market model given jointly by
(3) and (5) or by (6) and (7). Specifically, it shows the MSE of forecasts from our model
and seven alternative models. The alternative models are a random walk, random walk
with drift, three univariate state-space models with different signal-to-noise ratios, the oil
equation complementing the GDP equation (1) from a bivariate VAR, and a naive moving
N -period average. See Appendix A for a more detailed discussion of these models.
We conduct out-of-sample rolling forecasts but using whole-sample parameter estimates.
Although not ideal in cases where a sufficiently large sample is available, we use the whole
sample for parameter estimates for four reasons. First, the maximum forecast window of 40
quarters substantially reduces the sample, and breaking it into subsamples for estimation
and out-of-sample forecasting would further reduce the sample size used for estimation.
Second, the beginning of the sample (the 1970s and 1980s) is unusually problematic if we
do not control for the 1979-85 period. As illustrated in Figure 1, much of the correlation
between the two series becomes evident after 1986. Third, we would like to include 1979-85
in the forecasting model comparisons, since this was a controversial period in oil markets.
And fourth, if we do control for the 1979-85 period, the point estimates for the whole sample
or an early sub-sample are similar.
Of all models considered, the random walk models provide the best one-step ahead fore-
casts, since they yield the smallest MSEs at N = 1. At N = 40, our model outperforms all
13It is straightforward to show that if the mean shift occurred and (zt) were observed, least squares
estimation of βo and βw in (6) and (7) would be T -consistent, while least squares estimation in (3) and (5)
would be only
√
T -consistent with a more complicated limiting distribution.
9seven other models. This result holds regardless of the indicator specification. We inter-
pret this to mean that the random walk models provide the best short-horizon forecasted
averages, while our model provides the best long-horizon forecasted averages.
Between columns for N = 1 and N = 40, the table shows the threshold value beyond
which our model dominates up to N = 40. Average forecasts from our model dominate
those from a random walk and random walk with drift at 10, 14, or 7 quarters or more,
depending on the indicator specification. Note that the most conservative of the indicator
approaches is to include the indicator in the model, but exclude it from the forecast. Under
this approach, the random walk models hold out for 13 quarters against our model.
The forecasting performance of the univariate Kalman filter hinges on the signal-to-
noise ratio. With relatively large noise, the univariate model almost never outperforms our
model. With a very large signal, the univariate Kalman filter approximates the random walk
model, unless the indicator is excluded from the forecast. An advantage of our model over
the univariate specifications is that the covariate, global real economic activity, identifies
an appropriate signal-to-noise ratio.
Forecasts using the oil equation of a bivariate oil price-macroeconomy VAR, cumulated
to forecast levels, never dominate those from our model.
Finally, we consider a naive N -period moving average forecasting model that dampens
the volatility of the random walk model. For N = 1, this reduces to the random walk
model. For N = 40 this approach shows very weak forecasts.
Overall, our model performs best among those considered for forecasts of averages of 1
to N -periods ahead for N ≥ 26 quarters. It performs second best for 14 ≤ N < 26 quarters.
Since the lifespan of energy-intensive goods typically exceeds 14 quarters, and the planning
horizon of households is typically multiple years, our model provides an appropriate long-
horizon forecasting specification.
3.3 Decomposition
In constructing the decomposition of (∆ot), we include the indicator to improve estimation
of the oil market model. However, we take the more conservative approach of leaving the
indicator in the unanticipated component (∆oUt ) rather than in the forecasted component.
Empirically, including the indicator in (∆oUt ) makes little difference in comparing point esti-
mates with a decomposition without the indicator, since the first difference of the indicator
for 1979Q3-1985Q4 is only non-zero at two points, 1979Q3 and 1986Q1.
On the other hand, the results of Table 2 suggest that if an appropriate covariate can
be found to proxy for the 1979-85 episode in place of the indicator, so that the mean shift
is included in (∆oFt ), the forecasting ability of the oil market model might be improved.
Insert Figure 2 About Here
Figure 2 illustrates the estimated components (∆oFt ) and (∆o
U
t ) in comparison with
(∆ot). Notice that the forecasted component is much smoother than the oil price itself. All
of the major oil price spikes are unanticipated, except for some part of the recent downward
spike, which also correlates with a downward spike in both global and US real GDP.
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3.4 Results from the US GDP Models
Insert Table 3 About Here
Table 3 displays coefficient estimates and t-test statistics from the models in (1) and
(2), as well as a model using only ∆oF to measure oil. In Table 3, these models are labeled
respectively as Models 1, 3, and 2.
As Pagan (1984) noted, standard error estimates may be incorrect when using forecasts
from another model as regressors, which is the case in Models 2 and 3. That issue pertains
to our two-step technique, but since the oil forecasting model has an unobserved regressor
and the US GDP model is in first differences, Pagan’s suggested correction would not be
straightforward to adapt. Instead we take a nonparametric bootstrap approach, so that
critical values are tailored to the unknown null distributions of the test statistics. Since
these models are dynamic, we follow the suggested restricted sampling technique of van
Gierbergen and Kiviet (2002). We conduct 10, 000 bootstrap iterations for each coefficient
in each of the models.
Note that replacing first-differenced regressors in Model 1 with ∆oF in Model 2 increases
the fit (in R2) by 4%. Moreover, the coefficients are substantially larger – these regressors
have a smaller variance – and generally more significant. Adding ∆oU (Model 3), does much
less to improve the fit – an increase of 1.5%, but with the four additional regressors.
Insert Table 4 About Here
Table 4 shows three additional models. Model 4 includes only oil price increases, denoted
by ∆+o, in the spirit of Mork (1989), while Model 5 includes only net oil price increases
(NOPI), in the spirit of Hamilton (1996, 2003). Compare these with Model 6, using only
increases in unanticipated deviations from the forecasted average, denoted by ∆+oU , which
includes the major oil price spikes that Mork and Hamilton intended to capture with their
measures. The signs and magnitudes of estimates using all three models are roughly sim-
ilar. The fit of NOPI is the best among these three. In fact, ∆+oU does not show much
improvement in fit over simple first differences. Out of all of the models using only one set
of oil regressors (Models 1, 2, 4, 5, and 6), the models using NOPI and ∆oF have the best
– roughly comparable – fit.
Insert Table 5 About Here
Table 5 shows the final three models. These are essentially variations of the model given
by (2), Model 3, but allowing for the possibility of asymmetric responses of GDP. (∆+ and
∆− denote only positive and negative changes respectively.) Allowing asymmetric responses
to ∆oF increases fit by only 2% (Model 2 to Model 7). Considering ∆−oU as well as ∆+oU
increases fit by just over 2% (Model 6 to Model 8). Model 9, the most inclusive, naturally
has the highest fit, and also the highest penalized fit (R¯2, not shown).
3.5 Cumulative Conditional Responses
In order to see more clearly the effects on real GDP implied by the coefficient estimates of
Model 9, we construct cumulative conditional responses, similar to those estimated by Kilian
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(2009).14 As Kilian noted, the errors of the models used to estimate these responses are
serially correlated. We circumvent the serial correlation by estimating the dynamic model,
and then inverting it – similarly to inverting a VAR to get impulse response functions.
In this way our estimation is both parsimonious and efficient. The reader is referred to
Appendix B for more details.
Insert Figure 3 About Here
Figure 3 shows the cumulative conditional response of US real GDP to unit increases
in ∆+oFt , ∆
+oUt or unit decreases in ∆
−oFt , ∆
−oUt , net of lagged real GDP and holding
constant the other oil-related regressors and future stochastic changes in the same compo-
nent. Although a unit increase in ∆+oFt may be correlated with future changes ∆
+oFt+j and
∆yt+k, which also have impacts on ∆yt+q for j, k < q, we isolate only the effects of ∆
+oFt
directly on ∆yt+1, . . . ,∆yt+q and not indirectly through either ∆
+oFt+j , ∆yt+k, or the other
oil-related regressors. These direct effects are then cumulated. Specifically, we re-estimate
Model 9 with oil-related regressors orthogonalized with respect to lagged real GDP. Because
of the orthogonalization before inversion, the regressors and error are uncorrelated, so the
response to a one unit change in one of the real oil component regressors may be interpreted
as net of lagged real GDP, similarly to Kilian’s (2009) static model.
The cumulative conditional response of an increase in ∆+oFt appears to be quite large
and the edge of the 90% confidence band falls close to zero. A one-time 1% increase in
∆+oFt , holding the other components constant, is correlated with a 0.11% decrease in real
GDP growth, fully realized after about 4 quarters. In contrast, a one-time 1% increase in
∆+oUt has a significant impact with a similar cumulative shape, but only about a 0.05%
cumulative impact. The responses to ∆oF appear to be symmetric in sign – that is, increases
are followed by decreases in real GDP growth, and decreases are followed by increases in
real GDP growth, while different in magnitude – the cumulative effect of a decrease in
∆−oFt is only 0.07%. On the contrary, responses to ∆o
U appear to be both asymmetric in
sign – both increases and decreases are followed by decreases in real GDP growth, and in
magnitude – the cumulative effect of a 1% decrease in ∆−oUt is only about 0.025%.
3.6 Counterfactual GDP Growth
The remaining figures, Figures 4 and 5, show the actual log difference of US real GDP (real
GDP growth) compared with four different counterfactual paths for GDP real growth cre-
ated by omitting various orthogonalized components of oil price changes. The methodology
used is similar to that used for the conditional response analysis above, and is described in
detail in Appendix B. The important point is that the regressors, after orthogonalization
and inversion, are not correlated with the residual. As a result, a counterfactual without
lagged real oil price growth – or without a component of real oil price growth – is created by
subtracting out only the part uncorrelated with lagged GDP growth and uncorrelated with
14These responses are to the orthogonalized regressors rather than to structural shocks in a restricted VAR.
Consequently, our empirical finding of asymmetry contrasts with the rejection of asymmetric responses to
structural shocks by Kilian and Vigfusson (2009).
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the other components of real oil price growth. That way, lagged real GDP growth itself is
not omitted as an explanatory variable of current real GDP growth in the counterfactual.
Otherwise, if some part of lagged real GDP growth were omitted, the importance of oil
would be overstated.
The intercept still reflects deterministic changes in oil price growth. The counterfactuals
may therefore be interpreted as what real GDP growth would have been if real oil prices
had followed the estimated linear trend without fluctuations.
Insert Figure 4 About Here
The top panel of Figure 4 shows a counterfactual constructed by omitting the lagged real
oil price growth terms from Model 1 as a baseline. Over most of the sample, the counterfac-
tual without real oil price fluctuations estimated using this model appears roughly similar
to actual real GDP growth. These results suggests that without real oil price fluctuations,
the 1974 recession would have been eliminated, while those of 1980 and 1991 would have
been just barely mitigated. Because the sum of the coefficients of the lags of the oil price
is negative, Model 1 predicts a large boom following the 1986 oil price collapse and a sig-
nificant slowdown without the oil price collapse. The absence of the predicted boom by the
benchmark model is an important empirical motivation for allowing asymmetric responses
of real GDP to real oil price increases and decreases. The counterfactual from this model
has little to say about the effect on real GDP growth of the oil price run-up of the 2000s.
The bottom panel of Figure 4 shows a similar counterfactual, but based on subtracting
out all of the oil terms of Model 9, rather than Model 1. The recession of 1974 is actually
reversed. The recessions of 1980 and 1991 are also mitigated, but not eliminated. However,
the recovery from each recession is stronger under the counterfactual.
The 1986 oil price collapse seems to have had two effects. Without it, under the coun-
terfactual, there would have been a short stagnation, but a large subsequent increase. The
main effect of the oil price collapse seems to have been deleterious rather than salutary. As
Elder and Serletis (2010) showed, the collapse coincides with a surge in conditional volatil-
ity in oil prices. The negative effect we found is not net of the uncertainty. In fact, it is
reasonable to speculate that the negative effect of temporary declines in oil prices stems
mainly from increased uncertainty and that the uncertainty is the cause of the negative
effect on GDP. If we were to include a proxy for uncertainty in the GDP equation, then we
would expect the coefficients of ∆−oU to turn positive. Edelstein and Kilian (2007) took a
different view. They attributed the lack of a boom to other factors, such as the Tax Reform
Act of 1986.
A more dramatic cumulative effect of oil in the 2000s is evident from the sustained
gap between the actual and counterfactual real GDP growth rates. During 2003-07, the
annualize quarterly real GDP growth rate was 2.91%. The counterfactual using Model 1
suggests that the run-up in real oil prices in excess of the linear trend decreased the annual
growth rate by 0.58%, while that using Model 9 suggests the impact of this run-up was an
annual growth rate decrease of 1.35%.
Insert Figure 5 About Here
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Finally, Figure 5 shows counterfactuals without ∆+oF and ∆−oF (top panel) and with-
out ∆+oU and ∆−oU (bottom panel) from Model 9. In addition to orthogonalizing these
with respect to real GDP, they are also orthogonalized with respect to each other. That is,
we shut down only the parts of ∆+oF and ∆−oF orthogonal to ∆+oU and ∆−oU , and vice
versa.
∆+oU and ∆−oU appear to play a more important role during episodes of 1974, 1986,
and 1991, but are relatively unimportant during 2003-07. In contrast, ∆+oF and ∆−oF
appear to be less important during the former episodes, but more important during 2003-
07.
4 Concluding Remarks
Empirical studies on oil prices and the macroeconomy have generally focused on the effect
of shocks to (nonlinear functions of) oil prices. In this study, we decompose real oil price
changes into changes in forecasted long-term average real oil prices, ∆oF , and changes in
unanticipated deviations of actual current prices from these forecasted averages, ∆oU .
The second component is highly correlated with real oil price changes. Its asymmetric
relationship with future real GDP growth is qualitatively similar to that reported in previous
studies, such as Mork’s (1989). Since we postulate oil as a factor of production in global
real economic activity, some likely sources for these short-term fluctuations around the
estimated long-term fundamental include phenomena otherwise unexplained by our model,
such as temporary supply disruptions, precautionary demand (along the lines of Kilian,
2009), and speculation by investors.
Major innovations in oil prices, which are dominated by this second, unanticipated
component, create uncertainty. We speculate that this uncertainty is an important channel
through which large but temporary oil price changes affect the macroeconomy. A dramatic
price change may result in heightened uncertainty regarding future real oil prices. In that
case, there is an option value of waiting. Facing heightened uncertainty created by large
positive or negative changes in price, the economic agent may put off decisions to purchase
energy-intensive or energy-efficient cars or to install oil-burning or coal-burning electricity
generators, for example. The oil price increases of the 1970s, in particular, may have created
enough uncertainty to negatively affect real GDP, as suggested by Hamilton (1983). The
large decrease of 1986 may have created enough uncertainty to negatively – rather than
positively – affect GDP.15 The uncertainty channel implies asymmetry in the response of
GDP growth, as estimates in Table 5 and Figure 3 show.
In contrast, changes in the forecasted long-term average of real oil prices relate to future
real GDP growth in a different fashion. A decline in the forecasted average has a positive
effect on the investment and consumption decision, while an increase in the forecasted
average has a negative effect. This view is consistent with the notion that these changes
affect demand through an income effect or through changes in user costs of energy-intensive
15This is because the sum of the coefficients on unanticipated oil price decreases in the GDP equation is
positive in Model 9 (0.021). Using a different data sample (1949Q1-1988Q2), Mork (1989) found that the
sum of the coefficients on four lags of oil price decreases is a moderately positive 0.017.
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goods.16
Changes in the forecasted long-term average oil price are much smoother but have a
significant impact on future real GDP growth. We argue that the impact of oil price
changes is understated if one focuses only on unanticipated oil price shocks and does not
take into account long-term forecasts. As Figure 4 shows, a regression with real oil price
changes suggests little impact of the persistent run-up in oil prices from 2003-07 on GDP.
Using decomposed series, we conclude that the persistent run-up in oil price from 2003-07
reduced US GDP by about 1.35% annually during that period. The impact is substantial
despite the absence of a severe recession. Had the run-up not occurred, real GDP annual
growth would have been about 4.26% instead of 2.91%.
This point estimate appears to be too large in light of the oil share of GDP. However,
an increase of $30 per barrel in the forecast of the long-term average price with a 4%
annual discount rate (our estimate of γ02) and $10 million net imports per day (by EIA
estimates for the US) is equivalent to about $2.7 trillion in present value, or about 20%
of US GDP. A negative income effect alone of that magnitude can materially slow down
growth in consumption and investment. Figure 1 suggests that the 2003-07 run-up in
oil prices is mostly due to the increase in world real economic activity (demand for oil),
resulting in substantial increases in the forecasts of long-term average real prices. Despite
the absence of a recession, by our estimate using Model 9 the cumulative impact of the
run-up on real GDP (−6.78% over 20 quarters) is comparable to that of the oil crisis of
1974 (−5.98% over 5 quarters), mainly because the 2003-07 run-up is more persistent.
Edelstein and Kilian (2009) suggested that the changing automobile industry played a part
in differentiating the 2000s from the 1970s. Blanchard and Gal´ı (2010) suggested that labor
markets, monetary policy, and oil’s share of GDP also played a part. Our finding does not
contradict these explanations, nor does it contradict the fourth explanation of Blanchard
and Gal´ı (2010), “lack of concurrent adverse shocks.” There were concurrent revisions of
real oil price forecasts, but these were not unanticipated shocks.
The recognition of the negative impact of changes in the forecasted long-term average of
oil prices has policy implications. If the main impact of the oil market on the macroeconomy
is through the uncertainty created by large oil price shocks, then price stabilization – through
active management of strategic reserves, e.g. – should be an important policy objective.
On the other hand, if the forecast of the long-term average price is the key variable that
influences the decision-making of households and firms, then pursuing energy policies that
bring down long-term prices relative to an upward trend can stimulate more growth.
The main point that we wish to convey is that there exist multiple channels through
which oil price movements may affect real economic growth, and that the reaction of GDP
growth to oil price changes differs across these channels. We argue that the most meaningful
16There are economic reasons that responses to ∆oF may also be asymmetric. Lee and Ni (2002) found
differential effects of oil price shocks at the industry level. Sectoral imbalances caused by demand or supply
movements in different sectors make it desirable to shift capital or labor from one sector to another. The
resource and time costs associated with the sectoral shifts can generate an asymmetric GDP response to
positive and negative changes in oil price forecasts. The magnitude of the asymmetry depends on the
strength of the sectoral shift effect. Our empirical finding is that this is not the main channel of the oil price
effect – at least not within four quarters, which is the lag length in our GDP regression.
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way to distinguish these channels is by filtering the long-term information conveyed by real
price changes, in order to approximate economic agents’ interpretations of these changes.
Appendix A: Alternative Forecasting Models
We denote by vN,0 the MSE from forecasts of an N -period average around the N -period
average of actual values using the multivariate state-space model of the global oil market
model given jointly by (3) and (5) or by (6) and (7).
We denote by vN,1 and vN,2 the same MSEs using forecasts from random walk and
random walk with drift models
ot = ot−1 + ut and ot = ot−1 + γo2 + ut
respectively. (These are related to (3) by letting βo∆zt = ut and η
o
t = 0, subtracting ot−1
from both sides, cumulating both sides, and adding γo1 = o1 to both sides.) In this sense,
the random walk models may be represented as
ot = γo1 + γo2t+ βozt (8)
with z0 = 0, univariate state-space models with all signal and no noise.
We denote by vN,3, vN,4, and vN,5 the same MSEs using forecasts from a more general
univariate state-space model given by (3) with signal-to-noise ratio set to 3β2oT/2, 2β
2
oT ,
and 100β2oT respectively (where T is the sample size and βo is estimated). Specifically, the
variance of ∆zt is set to unity, so that the signal variance is β
2
oT . The variance of (η
o
t ) is
set to 2/3, 1/2, and 1/100 to get the desired ratios. Note that for a large signal-to-noise
ratio, such as 100β2oT , the models in (3) and (8) are virtually the same, unless an indicator
is included, as in (6).
We denote by vN,6 the same MSE using forecasts from the oil equation of a bivariate
VAR of the growth rates of real oil prices and US GDP, cumulated to forecast the level,
rather than difference of the log real oil price. That is, we estimate
∆ot = δo +
∑p
k=1
αok∆yt−k +
∑p
k=1
piok∆ot−k + ε
o
t ,
which together with (1) forms a bivariate VAR. The forecasts are created by cumulating
predictions ∆̂ot from this model, and then adding the initial observation, so that ôt =∑t
i=2 ∆̂oi + o1.
Finally, we denote by vN,7 the same MSE using an N -period naive moving average to
smooth the forecasts, so that ôt =
1
N
∑N−1
j=0 ot−j .
Appendix B: Response and Counterfactual Methodologies
Consider the benchmark model given by (1), and define ζt−1 = (∆yt−1, . . . ,∆yt−p)
′, ϑt−1 =
(∆ot−1, . . . ,∆ot−p)
′, pi = (pi1, . . . , pip)
′, and α = (α1, . . . , αp)
′. Define
ΞˆT ζt−1 =
∑
t
ϑt−1ζ
′
t−1
(∑
t
ζt−1ζ
′
t−1
)−1
ζt−1
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to be an orthogonal projection of (ϑt−1) onto the space spanned by (ζt−1). We may rewrite
the model as
∆yt = δ + (α
′ + pi′ΞˆT )ζt−1 + pi
′(ϑt−1 − ΞˆT ζt−1) + εt, (9)
where (ϑt−1−ΞˆT ζt−1) is the component of ϑt−1 that is orthogonal to ζt−1, and (α
′+pi′ΞˆT )ζt−1
captures the contribution to (∆yt) of both lagged (∆yt)’s and any part of lagged (∆ot)’s
correlated with the lagged (∆yt)’s. It is essential to purge this correlation, which exists by
assumption of the model, in order to isolate the effect of lagged (∆ot)’s directly on (∆yt)
and not indirectly through lagged (∆yt)’s.
Next, define Ξ = Eϑt−1ζ
′
t−1
(
Eζt−1ζ
′
t−1
)−1
and note that ΞˆT −Ξ = op(1) due to station-
arity of (∆ot) and (∆yt). Define α (z) = 1−
∑p
k=1(αk + pi
∗
k)z
k where pi∗k is the k
th column
of the row vector pi′Ξ and pi(z) =
∑p−1
k=0 pik+1z
k, so that the model may be rewritten as
α (L)∆yt = δ + pi(L)(∆ot−1 − ΞˆT ζt−1) + pi
′(ΞˆT − Ξ)ζt−1 + εt,
where L is the lag operator. Note that LkΞˆT ζt−1 =
∑
t ϑt−1−kζ
′
t−1
(∑
t ζt−1ζ
′
t−1
)−1
ζt−1 is
an orthogonal projection of (ϑt−1−k) onto the space spanned by (ζt−1).
Now, inverting the polynomial α (z), which is invertible by stationarity of (∆yt), we get
∆yt =
δ
α(1)
+ ϕ (L) (∆ot − L
−1ΞˆT ζt−1) + ψ(L)pi
′(ΞˆT − Ξ)ζt−1 + ψ(L)εt, (10)
where
∑∞
k=0 ϕkz
k = ϕ (z) = α(z)−1pi(z), ψ(z) = α(z)−1, and ϕ0 = 0. The cumulative
effect on (∆yt) of a unit increase in ∆ot−q for some q > 0 holding lagged (∆yt) constant is
given by
∑q
k=0 ϕk. The coefficients (ϕk) may be identified using a standard autoregressive
inversion formula with least squares estimates of (αk) and (pik). The same projection and
inversion may be performed on any of the models with decomposed oil price series, simply
by substituting the decomposition for (∆ot). The coefficients on each decomposed series
must be identified separately and interpreted as holding constant lagged (∆yt) and the other
oil price components.
We use
∑q
k=0 ϕk to compute the cumulative conditional response functions, or simi-
lar coefficients from the decomposed series, with confidence intervals created from 10, 000
bootstrap iterations using residuals estimated from the original model. The bootstrap data
generating process is similar to (10) with the order q of ϕ (L) set to 12. The differences
are the additional oil components in Model 9 and that the bootstrapped models are gen-
erated without orthogonalization. (Orthogonalization is primarily for identification and is
not necessary in the data generating process.) The reason for using an inverted model –
a static model with parametric serial correlation, rather than Model 9 – a dynamic model
– is to avoid potential pitfalls similar to that noted by van Gierbergen and Kiviet (2002)
using interval-based bootstrap tests with dynamic models.
To compute the counterfactual GDP growth series, we “shut down” the effect of oil
prices net of lagged GDP by subtracting ϕ (L) (∆ot − L
−1ΞˆT ζt−1) from ∆yt. Once the
coefficients (ϕk) are identified, this may be accomplished by regressing each (∆ot−k) up to
q onto (ζt−1) to create ϕ (L)L
−1ΞˆT ζt−1. Specifically, we regress out p lags of GDP growth
from p lags oil price growth to get the third term on the right-hand-side of (9), then we
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estimate the dynamic model in (9) to get α (z). We then invert α (z) to get q terms of
ϕ (z) in the static model in (10). Finally, we regress out p lags of GDP growth from q
lags of oil prices growth to get the second term of (10), which we subtract from (∆yt) to
get the counterfactuals for Model 1. Generalizing to Model 9, we have more oil-related
regressors. In order to compute the counterfactuals without subcomponents of (∆ot), we
simply regress out the subcomponents as well as GDP growth in the last step, immediately
before subtracting from (∆yt).
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Tables and Figures
Table 1. Oil Forecasting Model Estimates
w/o Indicator w/Indicator
γo1 0.2109(2.683)
∗∗∗ −0.0180(−0.289)
γo2 0.0093(2.208)
∗∗ 0.0106(2.746)∗∗∗
γo3 0.6788(12.097)
∗∗∗
βo 0.0506(8.874)
∗∗∗ 0.0470(11.424)∗∗∗
γw1 −0.0086(−1.798)
∗ −0.0086(−1.800)∗
γw2 0.0086(22.174)
∗∗∗ 0.0086(22.174)∗∗∗
γw3 −0.0004(−0.122)
βw 0.0048(17.435)
∗∗∗ 0.0048(17.434)∗∗∗
Table 1: Parameter estimates of the global oil market models given by (3) and (5) – without the
1979Q3-1985Q4 indicator – and by (6) and (7) – with the indicator – using the Kalman filter with
steady-state conditional variances. T-statistics shown in parentheses. Significance at 10%, 5%, and
1% denoted respectively by one, two, and three asterisks.
Table 2. Oil Forecasting Model Comparisons
w/o Indicator Indic. Not in KF Fore. Indic. in KF Fore.
v1 vN,i ≥ vN,0 v40 v1 vN,i ≥ vN,0 v40 v1 vN,i ≥ vN,0 v40
vN,0 0.094 0.074 0.113 0.076 0.042 0.188
vN,1 0.018 N ≥ 10 0.200 0.018 N ≥ 14 0.200 0.018 N ≥ 7 0.200
vN,2 0.018 N ≥ 10 0.192 0.018 N ≥ 14 0.192 0.018 N ≥ 7 0.192
vN,3 0.082 N ≥ 3 0.230 0.120 N ≥ 1 0.108 0.082 N ≥ 1 0.243
vN,4 0.072 N ≥ 4 0.233 0.098 N ≥ 5 0.110 0.068 N ≥ 1 0.251
vN,5 0.022 N ≥ 10 0.202 0.058 N ≥ 26 0.101 0.021 N ≥ 8 0.205
vN,6 0.253 N ≥ 1 0.374 0.253 N ≥ 1 0.374 0.253 N ≥ 1 0.374
vN,7 0.018 N ≥ 7 0.282 0.018 N ≥ 9 0.282 0.018 N ≥ 4 0.282
Table 2: MSE of predicted averages from forecasting models. Columns labeled with vN,i ≥ vN,0
show the threshold value at which (up to N = 40) the multivariate state-space model of the global
oil market model given jointly by (3) and (5) or by (6) and (7) is preferred for forecasted averages.
Multivariate and univariate state-space models are estimated with and without the 1979Q3-1985Q4
indicator. See Appendix A for a detailed discussion of the alternative forecasting models considered.
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Table 3. US GDP Growth Equation Estimates
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
∆yt−1 0.259(3.032)
∗∗∗ 0.242(2.084)∗∗ 0.213(1.782)∗
∆yt−2 0.106(1.193) 0.288(2.439)
∗∗∗ 0.259(2.141)∗∗
∆yt−3 0.000(0.003) 0.158(1.350) 0.133(1.110)
∆yt−4 −0.019(−0.228) 0.011(0.097) −0.002(−0.019)
∆ot−1 −0.008(−1.528)
∆ot−2 −0.006(−1.047)
∆ot−3 −0.004(−0.670)
∆ot−4 −0.009(−1.768)
∗
∆oFt−1 −0.003(−0.122) −0.004(−0.159)
∆oFt−2 −0.050(−2.340)
∗∗ −0.048(−2.025)∗∗
∆oFt−3 −0.034(−1.545)
∗ −0.032(−1.335)
∆oFt−4 0.006(0.292) 0.001(0.044)
∆oUt−1 −0.004(−0.811)
∆oUt−2 −0.004(−0.694)
∆oUt−3 −0.002(−0.402)
∆oUt−4 −0.006(−1.081)
R2 0.174 0.215 0.230
Table 3: Parameter estimates from models given by (1) – Model 1 – and (2) – Model 3, and from a
model with only ∆oF – Model 2. Intercept estimates not shown. T-statistics shown in parentheses.
Significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% denoted respectively by one, two, and three asterisks, calculated
using critical values from 10, 000 bootstrap iterations.
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Table 4. US GDP Growth Equation Estimates
Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
∆yt−1 0.223(2.594)
∗∗∗ 0.205(2.380)∗∗ 0.243(2.745)∗∗∗
∆yt−2 0.062(0.705) 0.049(0.560) 0.065(0.710)
∆yt−3 −0.008(−0.093) −0.015(−0.168) −0.019(−0.210)
∆yt−4 −0.041(−0.483) −0.057(−0.671) −0.076(−0.861)
∆+ot−1 −0.009(−1.256)
∆+ot−2 −0.014(−1.966)
∗
∆+ot−3 −0.008(−1.083)
∆+ot−4 −0.017(−2.239)
∗∗
NOPIt−1 −0.011(−1.237)
NOPIt−2 −0.020(−2.305)
∗∗
NOPIt−3 −0.014(−1.587)
NOPIt−4 −0.022(−2.560)
∗∗
∆+oUt−1 −0.008(−1.156)
∆+oUt−2 −0.011(−1.488)
∆+oUt−3 −0.005(−0.676)
∆+oUt−4 −0.016(−2.172)
∗∗
R2 0.201 0.219 0.176
Table 4: Parameter estimates from models with only oil price increases – Model 4, with only net oil
price increases (NOPI, 12 quarters) – Model 5, and with only ∆+oU– Model 6. Intercept estimates
not shown. T-statistics shown in parentheses. Significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% denoted respectively
by one, two, and three asterisks, calculated using critical values from 10, 000 bootstrap iterations.
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Table 5. US GDP Growth Equation Estimates
Model 7 Model 8 Model 9
∆yt−1 0.238(2.032)
∗∗ 0.229(2.552)∗∗∗ 0.162(1.335)
∆yt−2 0.299(2.509)
∗∗∗ 0.080(0.867) 0.249(2.004)∗∗
∆yt−3 0.150(1.253) −0.019(−0.201) 0.097(0.801)
∆yt−4 0.012(0.103) −0.083(−0.920) −0.028(−0.238)
∆+oFt−1 −0.007(−0.235) −0.001(−0.030)
∆+oFt−2 −0.044(−1.479) −0.037(−1.189)
∆+oFt−3 −0.022(−0.753) −0.016(−0.525)
∆+oFt−4 −0.030(−0.986) −0.042(−1.323)
∆−oFt−1 0.007(0.236) 0.009(0.283)
∆−oFt−2 −0.059(−1.940)
∗ −0.063(−1.896)∗
∆−oFt−3 −0.047(−1.510) −0.042(−1.242)
∆−oFt−4 0.039(1.291) 0.036(1.122)
∆+oUt−1 −0.008(−1.022) −0.004(−0.498)
∆+oUt−2 −0.014(−1.873)
∗ −0.017(−2.192)∗∗
∆+oUt−3 −0.006(−0.869) −0.009(−1.128)
∆+oUt−4 −0.016(−2.147)
∗∗ −0.011(−1.379)
∆−oUt−1 −0.002(−0.234) −0.003(−0.342)
∆−oUt−2 0.016(1.617) 0.014(1.446)
∆−oUt−3 0.007(0.764) 0.007(0.740)
∆−oUt−4 0.007(0.718) 0.003(0.294)
R2 0.235 0.199 0.295
Table 5: Parameter estimates from models given by allowing asymmetric responses of US GDP to
changes in both oil price components – Model 9, and from models given by subsets of these regressors
– Models 7 and 8. Intercept estimates not shown. T-statistics shown in parentheses. Significance at
10%, 5%, and 1% denoted respectively by one, two, and three asterisks, calculated using critical
values from 10, 000 bootstrap iterations.
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Figure 1: Log real oil prices and log global real GDP, detrended with a linear trend and a linear
trend plus the 1979Q3-1985Q4 binary. One and two asterisks denote respectively 10% and 5%
significance of Phillips-Ouliaris (1990) tests.
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Figure 2: Decomposition of the first difference of log real oil prices into forecasted and unanticipated
components.
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Figure 3: Cumulative conditional responses to unit increases in ∆+oFt , ∆
+oUt and unit decreases
in ∆−oFt , ∆
−oUt , holding the other components constant and orthogonalized with respect to GDP.
5% and 95% quantiles shown, constructed using 10, 000 bootstrap iterations. See Appendix B.
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Figure 4: Actual US GDP growth rates compared to counterfactual US GDP growth rates with
no stochastic oil fluctuations. (a) Counterfactual calculated by subtracting the oil component of
Model 1, orthogonalized with respect to GDP. (b) Counterfactual calculated by subtracting all oil
components of Model 9, orthogonalized with respect to GDP. See Appendix B.
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Figure 5: Actual US GDP growth rates compared to counterfactual US GDP growth rates. (a) No
forecasted stochastic components in Model 9. Counterfactual calculated by subtracting forecasted
stochastic components (positive and negative changes), orthogonalized with respect to GDP and
unanticipated components (positive and negative changes). (b) No unanticipated components in
Model 9. Counterfactual calculated by subtracting unanticipated components (positive and negative
changes), orthogonalized with respect to GDP and stochastic forecasted components (positive and
negative changes). See Appendix B.
